Refinement is a relation on systems models: a concrete model is a refinement of a more abstract model if it has fewer behaviours. When properties of the abstract model are guaranteed to be preserved in the concrete model, refinement supports a top-down development process. This paper considers preservation of a range of information flow security properties in synchronous systems with schedulers, when these schedulers are refined. Notions of refinement are defined for both an abstract notion of scheduler as well as for their concrete representation as automata. The security properties that are preserved by refinement over schedulers are then characterized. The results are applied to characterize a number of scheduler independent security properties, which state that a system is secure with respect to all schedulers.
Introduction
Information-flow security is concerned with the ability of agents in a system to make deductions about the activity of others, or to cause information to flow to other agents. This paper is part II of a two part series in which we conduct a systematic study of the impact of schedulers on information-flow security. In part I of the series, we proposed a number of variants of existing definitions of security from the literature that newly accommodate the setting of synchronous scheduled systems, and study the relationships between the new definitions.
In deploying a system, it may be desirable to adapt the scheduler under which it runs to accommodate the performance requirements of the particular Email addresses: meyden@cse.unsw.edu.au (Ron van der Meyden), czhang@unsw.edu.au (Chenyi Zhang) NOTICE: this is the authors' version of a work that was accepted for publication in Theoretical Computer Science. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. deployment context. The maximum degree of flexibility for such adaptations obtains when the system satisfies the desired properties for all schedulers. Failing this, an alternate approach would be to first show that the system has these properties for some abstract scheduler, and then rely on a result stating that the desired properties are preserved however that scheduler is made more concrete. Such relationships between the abstract and the concrete are formalized in the literature using notions of refinement, which are relations on systems, defined by stating that system A refines system B if every observable behaviour of A is also an observable behaviour of B (see e.g. [GM93] ). Such refinement relations can be used in a top-down development process, where they generally ensure that properties of the more liberal system description B are preserved in the more specific implementation represented by A.
However, many information-flow properties are not preserved by refinement, i.e., when A refines B, the fact that B satisfies an information-flow property does not necessarily imply that A also satisfies that property. This is known as the refinement paradox [Jac88, McL94] . The present paper considers which of the new definitions of security from Part I are preserved under refinement of schedulers, and applies the results to characterize definitions that state that a system is secure with respect to all schedulers.
We work with a setting in which systems contain a low security level agent L and a high security level agent H, and in which the security policy states, intuitively, that information about H should not flow to L. The definitions we developed in part I are variants of the following three types of definitions from the prior literature which capture ways that L might deduce information about H:
1. nondeducibility on inputs [Sut86] , which is appropriate for settings where L acts as an outside observer attempting to infer, from its observations, information about H activity, 2. the stronger notion of nondeducibility on strategies [WJ90] , which takes into account that L may have placed a Trojan horse at H, and requires that no flow of information from H to L is possible even if this is the case, and 3. restrictiveness [McC87, McC88] , a definition stronger than both of the above, which is closely related to the unwinding [GM84] proof technique for noninterference, and one of Focardi and Gorrieri's bisimulation based definitions of security [FG95] .
In developing variants of these notions that are suited for our setting of scheduled synchronous systems, we found that there is more than one plausible candidate for each of these notions in a setting with nondeterministic schedulers. Non-deterministic schedulers allow multiple concrete schedules, and the precise schedule in a given run, which orders H, L and system actions, might not be known to L. We generally work with H-oblivious schedulers, i.e., schedulers that are independent of H's behaviour, so that the scheduler itself does not represent a channel for flow of information from H to L. One of the dimensions causing the bifurcation of definitions is the question of whether security should be preserved even if the precise schedule were to become known to L.
Another factor affecting the formulation of the definitions is the representation for schedulers. We work with two types of representation. One is abstract: it views a scheduler as a function that determines which agent can be scheduled next after a given history. The other representation is concrete: it implements an abstract scheduler as an automaton. It turns out that our new variants of nondeducibility on inputs and nondeducibility on strategies are not sensitive to the choice of concrete scheduler implementation. Our variants of restrictiveness require a concrete scheduler implementation in their statement, but are sensitive to the choice of implementation. In order to obtain implementationindependent variant of the restrictiveness definitions that is meaningful at the level of abstract schedulers, we need to quantify over scheduler implementations. The quantification can be done universally or existentially, each leading to a different definition. We summarize the resulting definitions and their relationships in Section 2, but we refer the reader to part I of the paper for a detailed discussion of the notions defined within each class.
Our contribution in the present paper is to consider refinement relations on schedulers and their impact on the definitions of security from part I. In particular, at the abstract level, we take one scheduler to refine another when, for all histories, the set of enabled agents for the latter scheduler is a subset of that for the former. We ask whether security is preserved under this notion of scheduler refinement, i.e., whether, if a system is secure with respect to a scheduler, it is also secure with respect to all its refinements.
When we consider our variants of nondeducibility on inputs and nondeducibility on strategies, we find that the only versions of these notions that are preserved under refinement are the versions that require that the the system to remain secure even if the schedule were to become known to L. In case of our four implementation-independent variants of restrictiveness, we again find that only the two stronger variants (which quantify universally over scheduler implementations) are preserved under scheduler refinement. In order to establish this result, we introduce a notion of refinement on concrete scheduler implementations, and develop results on scheduler refinement at the concrete level.
As a benefit of this study of refinement, we also obtain answers to the question of when a system is secure with respect to all schedulers. As noted above, this is a quite desirable property, since it means that the system can be very flexibly configured: the scheduler can be selected arbitrarily according to the requirements of the specific environment within which the system is to operate, without loss of security. One can ask this question for each of the notions of security from part I. It turns out that many of the distinctions collapse in this case. We characterize the collapse, and moreover show that for each of the remaining distinct notions, the question of security with respect to all schedulers can be characterized as security with respect to a particular scheduler. This fact helps to simplify the problem of verifying that the system is secure for all schedulers by reducing it to a single case.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly recall the system model and the security notions from part I. Section 3 introduces a notion of refinement on schedulers and studies the security properties that are preserved by this relation. Section 4 considers a new refinement relation on scheduler implementations which preserves some bisimulation based properties. Section 5 deals with a generalization of scheduler implementation independence -the security of systems for all schedulers in certain classes. Section 6 addresses related work and in Section 7 we summarize the results of the paper and make some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
This section present the formal model on which the new security notions are defined. For a detailed discussion of the security motivations and examples to distinguish the notions, we refer to part I of the paper. We consider a synchronous model in which there is a discrete global clock shared by all agents, and all agents are able to continue making observations at all times, including times when they are not scheduled to perform an action. We define a signature as a tuple (A, D, d om) consisting of a set of actions A, a set of agents D and a function d om : A → D associating an agent with each action. For u ∈ D we define A u = {a ∈ A | dom(a) = u} to be the set of actions associated to domain u. For a number of semantic purposes (machines and schedulers), we use the following general type of model that is essentially a classical labelled transition system enhanced by observation functions. For readability, we 'curry' the function obs (or its variants) by writing obs u (s) for obs(u, s). We write s −→ s n with s 0 ∈ S 0 . We write R(T ) for the set of all runs of T . We write r k for the prefix of r consisting of the first k transitions, i.e., r k = s 0
provided r has at least k transitions. We denote the sequence of actions in a run r by Act(r) = a 1 a 2 . . . a n , and for each agent u write Act u (r) for the subsequence of Act(r) consisting of actions a with d om(a) = u. A SOLTS is deterministic if for s, t 1 , t 2 ∈ S and a ∈ A, if s a −→ t 1 and s a −→ t 2 then t 1 = t 2 . It is input-enabled if s a −→ for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A. An agent's observations give it knowledge about the present and past. The following definition of the view function aims to capture this intention; a view is a trace of an agent's past, alternating observations and actions.
Definition 2.2. Given a SOLTS T and an agent u, the function view u :
* is inductively defined by view u (s 0 ) = obs u (s 0 ), and
where r ∈ R(T ), a ∈ A and s ∈ S. We write Views u (T ) for {view u (r) | r ∈ R(T )}.
Intuitively, this says that an agent's view of a run is the log of all its observations as well as its own actions in the run, with " " where an action of another agent is performed. We note that implicit in this definition is an assumption of synchrony, in the sense that an agent can always determine from its view view u (r) of a run r what is the time (the length of r), simply by counting the number of elements of O or A u ∪ { }.
Like most of the literature, we confine our attention to systems with two security domains High (H) and Low (L) and the security policy L ≤ H, which permits information flow from L to H but prohibits information flow from H to L. However, in order to deal with scheduling and passage of time, it is convenient to include a third agent S ys that may act when both H and L are waiting. The agent S ys can be understood as corresponding to the scheduler activity as well as system internal actions. For the remainder of this paper, we let D = {H, L, S ys}. The systems we study in the paper are defined as follows: Definition 2.3. A machine is an input-enabled SOLTS M = S, S 0 , →, O, obs for a signature (A, D, d om) with D = {H, L, S ys} and A S ys = {τ }. We write M for the set of all machines.
The condition that A S ys = {τ } still allows that S ys actions may be nondeterministic, but we assume that there is no need to distinguish specific S ys events. Whereas A H and A L can be thought of as representing inputs provided by the agents, S ys provides no inputs, but only represents the automatic evolution of the state over time. Given an action sequence α ∈ A * and A ′ ⊆ A, write α|A ′ for the sequence obtained from α by removing all actions not in A ′ . Diagrammatic Convention for Machines: When presenting examples we depict machines as graphs in which vertices correspond to states, and are labelled by the observation made by L at that state. Edges are labelled by actions and correspond to transitions. Not all transitions from a state are depicted: if the only transition with a given action is a self-loop, it may be elided. Since machines are input-enabled, where there is no edge labelled by an action a from a state s, this implies that there is a self-loop from s labelled by a. (This convention helps to reduce clutter in diagrams of machines.)
Schedulers
The scheduler defined in this paper only resolves the nondeterminism concerning the next agent to act: we leave this agent free will to choose which action to perform when it is scheduled. Definition 2.4. A scheduler (for a machine M with actions A and domains D) is a function σ : A * → P(D). A scheduled machine is a pair (M, σ) consisting of a machine M and a scheduler σ for M .
We write Υ for the set of all schedulers. Intuitively, given a history of actions α ∈ A * , one of the agents in the set σ(α) will be scheduled next. This definition leaves underspecified precisely how and when the nondeterminism in a scheduler is resolved. Later we introduce the notion of scheduler SOLTS which provides a more concrete way to model this nondeterminism. A schedule is a finite or infinite sequence sch = u 0 u 1 u 2 u 3 . . . where each u i ∈ D. For α = a 0 a 1 a 2 . . ., we write sch(α) for the schedule d om(a 0 ) d om(a 1 ) d om(a 2 ) . . .. If r is a run we also write sch(r) for sch(Act(r)).
We say that a run of a machine is compatible with a scheduler if the agent that acts at each step of the run is one of the agents enabled by the scheduler, given the history so far. Formally, compatibility of a finite sequence of actions with a scheduler σ is defined by the following induction: the empty sequence ǫ is compatible with σ, and αa is compatible with σ iff α is compatible with σ and dom(a) ∈ σ(α), where α ∈ A * and a ∈ A. An infinite action sequence is compatible with a scheduler σ if all its finite prefixes are compatible with σ. A run r of a machine is defined to be compatible with a scheduler σ if Act(r) is compatible with σ. Given a machine M , we write R(M, σ) for the set of all runs of M compatible with σ. We also write Views u (M, σ) for {view u (r) | r ∈ R(M, σ)}.
We henceforth assume that schedulers do not terminate, so that if α is compatible with σ, then σ(α) = ∅. A scheduler σ is deterministic if σ(α) is a singleton for all compatible α ∈ A * . We write Υ d for the set of deterministic schedulers.
Schedulers may be represented as SOLTS. A scheduler SOLTS is a SOLTS of the form Q, Q 0 , →,{⊥}, obs that satisfies 1. there is a transition from each state, 2. all transitions from a state are by the same agent, and all actions of that agent are enabled, i.e., if s (Note that (3) means that agents do not obtain information about the scheduled agents from their observations on any state of a scheduler SOLTS.) Let sched : Q → D map each scheduler SOLTS state to the unique agent that has its actions enabled in the state. A scheduler SOLTS Q, Q 0 , →, {⊥}, obs represents a scheduler σ if for all α ∈ A * compatible with σ, we have
Scheduling may be represented as a parallel composition of a machine and a scheduler SOLTS. Given a machine M = S, S 0 , →, O, obs , and a scheduler SOLTS A = Q, Q 0 , → ′ , ⊥, obs ′ with the same signature, the parallel composition
This corresponds to the lock-step execution of the two systems with synchronisation on actions.
In order to prevent the scheduler being a channel for information flow, we define a notion that expresses that the decisions of the scheduler are independent of the actions of an agent. For the definition, we need an operation on actions that masks actions of agent u: define µ u (a) = a when a ∈ A \ A u and µ u (a) = ⊥ u when a ∈ A u . For a sequence α = a 1 a 2 . . .
Intuitively, this says that scheduling decisions do not depend on the actions performed by agent u. We may therefore view a u-oblivious scheduler σ as a function from (µ u (A))
* to P(D), where µ u (A) = (A\A u )∪{⊥ u }. A scheduler is oblivious if it is u-oblivious for all u ∈ D. Similarly, a scheduler SOLTS is u-oblivious for u ∈ D if for all states s, t and actions a, if s a −→ t and dom(a) = u then s c −→ t for all actions c ∈ A u . Intuitively, this says that the state t carries no information about which u action was used to reach it. A scheduler SOLTS is oblivious if it is u-oblivious for all u ∈ D. A dual notion called schedule-awareness is defined as follows. An agent u is schedule-aware in a scheduled machine (M, σ), if for all runs r, r ′ ∈ R(M, σ), we have that view u (r) = view u (r ′ ) implies sch(r) = sch(r ′ ). Intuitively, this says that the agent always knows the schedule of the current run.
It can be seen that for an oblivious scheduler σ, we have that σ(α) depends only on sch(α). We may therefore represent an oblivious scheduler σ by the set of all its schedules, or more concisely by a set whose prefix closure is the set of schedules generated by σ. We often do this when presenting examples, where we represent such sets of schedules by regular expressions, using operators + for union, concatenation for sequencing, * for (Kleene) finite iteration, and ω for infinite iteration.
As we confine ourselves to the policy L ≤ H, we need to ensure that the schedules obtained, which may be observable to L, do not convey information to L about H's activity. Therefore we focus on H-oblivious schedulers, in which schedules do not carry any information about H actions. Write Υ HO for the set of schedulers that are H-oblivious, and Υ O for the set of oblivious schedulers. We will be interested in definitions of security that classify a machine M as secure or insecure when it is scheduled according to a scheduler σ. We define the security of scheduled machines (M, σ), and assume agents have a synchronous view of the machine, make an observation at each moment of time, and are able to distinguish one moment of time from the next, even if they did not perform an action. We permit that the agents are aware of the scheduler being used, but may not have complete information concerning the schedule in a particular run. In the case when a scheduler SOLTS is given, we define security of the composite system M A. For our trace-based security properties, it can be shown that (M, σ) is secure iff M A is secure for any scheduler SOLTS A that represents σ. That is, such definitions are implementation independent. However, this is not true for our bisimulation-based properties. Detailed explanations of this are presented in Part I of the paper.
We also seek properties with respect to a set of schedulers. Given Σ ⊆ Υ, we write X(Σ) for the set of machines M such that (M, σ) ∈ X for all σ ∈ Σ. (When Σ = {σ}, we write simply X(σ).) This gives a notion that is of independent interest: if M ∈ X(Σ), we are guaranteed that M is secure according to property X whatever scheduler in Σ is selected. This gives flexibility in the choice of a scheduler for the machine, which is desirable for machines that need to be deployed into diverse settings.
Diagrammatic Convention for Scheduler SOLTS: we depict scheduler SOLTS as graphs in which vertices correspond states, and are labelled by the agent whose actions are enabled at that state. Edges are labelled by actions and correspond to transitions. All transitions from a state are depicted: we note that we use a different diagrammatic convention in the diagrams of machines, where self-loops are elided.
Trace-based Security Definitions
For asynchronous systems, the notion of nondeducibility on inputs (NDI) [Sut86] states that a system is secure if L cannot deduce from its view any information about the sequence of H actions that have been performed. We formulate the following three versions of NDI for scheduled machines.
Definition 2.5. Let M be a machine and σ a scheduler.
• (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 1 if for all possible L views β ∈ Views L (M, σ) and H sequences α ∈ A ω H , there is a run r ∈ R(M, σ) such that view L (r) = β and Act H (r) is a prefix of α.
• (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 2 if for all possible L views β ∈ Views L (M, σ), and sequences of H actions α ∈ A * H with |α| ∈ Pna H (M, σ, β), there exists r in R(M, σ) such that Act H (r) = α and view L (r) = β, where Pna H (M, σ, β) is the set of numbers n such that there exists r ∈ R(M, σ) with view L (r) = β and |Act H (r)| = n.
• (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 3 if for all r ∈ R(M, σ), and α ∈ A * H with |α| = |Act H (r)|, there exists a run r ′ ∈ R(M, σ) with sch(r) = sch(r ′ ) and view
Intuitively, the first definition tNDI 1 says that L is never able to rule out α as the sequence of actions that will be performed by H over time. If L is able to rule out a prefix of α then L will be able to rule out α as an infinite sequence of H actions, therefore tNDI 1 can be regarded as a basic security requirement -every finite H behaviour is (potentially) possible from every L-view. This notion does not take into account the fact that L may be able to determine from its view some constraints on the number of H actions that have been (actually) performed in the run. Plainly, the number of H actions cannot be more than the number of observations in the view. However, knowledge of the scheduler may enable L to further restrict this set of possibilities, or even to determine the exact number of H actions. The second definition tNDI 2 is based on this intuition that the possible numbers of H actions should be all that L knows about the H actions. (However, the fact that there is nondeterminism in the scheduler leaves open the possibility that the new sequence of H actions may need to be scheduled in a different way in order to preserve the L view.) The last definition tNDI 3 states that L should not be able to make any deductions about what actions H has performed, even if L were to discover the schedule.
Nondeducibility on inputs represents an attack model in which it is assumed that L is the attacker and H is a trusted agent that may engage in any of its possible behaviours. A stronger attack model is to consider situations where H may be a Trojan horse or insider that is attempting to pass information to L. By engaging in specific behaviour, known to L, it may be possible for the insider to pass information to L. Wittbold and Johnson [WJ90] showed by example that nondeducibility on inputs is too weak for this type of attack, and proposed an alternative definition called nondeducibility on strategies (NDS). We can formulate a variant of this notion as follows. First we capture the effect of a particular H-level process:
for the set of runs in R(M, σ) that are consistent with π.
Intuitively, an H strategy is a rule describing how the agent H chooses its next action as a function of its view, and a run is consistent with a strategy if at each stage in the construction of the run, the next H action executed is chosen according to this rule.
Using the notion of strategy, we may now formulate definitions of security in scheduled machines that are similar to Wittbold and Johnson's notion of nondeducibility on strategies in their simultaneous action setting.
Definition 2.7. Let M be a machine and σ a scheduler.
• (M, σ) ∈ tNDS 1 if for every r ∈ R(M, σ) and H strategy π, there exists
• (M, σ) ∈ tNDS 2 if for every r ∈ R(M, σ) and H strategy π, there exists
Intuitively, tNDS 1 says that for all strategies π that H might choose to run, there is no change to the set of possible L views, which is always the same as the set of possible L views when H does not constrain its behaviour in any way. Thus, there is no way that a Trojan horse at H could pass information to L by constraining H behaviour to a particular strategy. However, it is also of interest to consider the security of a scheduled machine when L may learn the schedule producing a particular run. This leads to tNDS 2 .
Bisimulation-based Security Definitions
McCullough introduced a security properties called Restrictiveness (RES) for nondeterministic event systems with states [McC88] . The essence of this notion in state-based model is a nondeterministic generalization of the notion of unwinding relation [GM84] , which is a binary relation ≈ on the set of machine states. In asynchronous systems, an unwinding relation is a bisimulation relation treating L's inputs as external actions, with H actions not causing changes distinguishable by L. The conditions are as follows:
(LR a ) For all states s, t and actions
For scheduled systems, we defined in part I two variants of this idea.
1. An insensitive synchronous unwinding relation is a relation ≈ ⊆ S × S including (s 0 , s 0 ) for all s 0 ∈ S 0 , satisfying OC, SC and LR, where LR is defined as: for all states s, s ′ with s ≈ s ′ and actions a, b ∈ A H ∪ A S ys , if 
Say that a state s is reachable if there exists an initial state s 0 and a sequence of actions α ∈ A * such that s 0 α −→ s. The existence of an (in)sensitive unwinding on a SOLTS may depend on the behaviour of the SOLTS on unreachable states. On the other hand, it seems unreasonable that the security of the system should be affected by the behaviour of the system on unreachable states. Thus, we henceforth assume that every state is reachable. Note that given the set of states S of the machine M and Q of the scheduler SOLTS A, it is possible that not all states in S × Q are reachable in the combined SOLTS M A even if all states in S and Q are reachable in M and A, respectively. In this case we restrict the combined SOLTS M A to the reachable subset of S × Q.
One major difference between RES and NDI/NDS is that the definition of RES requires an explicit representation of states and transitions, which is more discriminative than the notion of sets of runs required for NDI/NDS. In order to formulate a version of RES for a scheduled machine (M, σ) we need to apply the notion of unwinding relation to the SOLTS (M A) where A represents σ.
A problem that then arises is two implementations of a scheduler may vary in their branching structure, but unwinding is sensitive to this structure. It turns out that satisfaction of tRES 1 and tRES 2 depends on the choice of the scheduler implementations: there exists systems M and implementations A 1 and A 2 of a scheduler σ such that M A 1 and M A 2 do not both satisfy these properties. Detailed examples are given in part I. This observation leads to the following notions, in which we quantify over scheduler implementations in order to obtain implementation independent definitions of security. 
Refinement of Schedulers
Refinement relations are used in the literature to relate abstract system descriptions to more concrete system descriptions in such a way that certain properties of interest are preserved. Such a relation is useful in ensuring that design decisions in a top-down development approach preserve system properties established earlier in the design process. Refinement has been studied for a variety of underlying system semantics and types of property. In this section we introduce a notion of refinement between schedulers and study whether the trace-based security properties in systems with scheduling are preserved by this definition.
Definition 3.1. For schedulers σ and σ ′ , we write σ ′ ⊑ σ, and say that σ refines σ ′ , if σ(α) ⊆ σ ′ (α) for all α compatible with σ.
Intuitively, σ refines σ ′ if σ has fewer choices than σ ′ . (The contravariance of this definition follows the convention in the literature, e.g., [HHS87] , in the sense that if A refines B then A is said to be more concrete and thus more deterministic than B.) We have the following property for the refinement relation.
Lemma 3.2. For schedulers σ and σ ′ , σ ′ ⊑ σ iff for all α ∈ A * , if α is compatible with σ then α is compatible with σ ′ .
Proof: Straightforward induction on the length of the action sequence α. Now we seek an answer to the question whether, given a machine M and a scheduler σ such that (M, σ) satisfies a property X, a refinement σ ′ of σ satisfies (M, σ ′ ) ∈ X. We find that for some properties, such as tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 , which require that no information is permitted to flow from H to L even when L knows the exact schedule of a particular run, security is preserved by H-oblivious refinements. That is, if (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 3 (or tNDS 2 ), then (M, σ ′ ) ∈ tNDI 3 (or tNDS 2 ) provided σ ⊑ σ ′ and σ ′ ∈ Υ HO . However, for the other trace-based security properties (tNDI 1 , tNDI 2 and tNDS 1 ), this result does not hold. We start with the following lemma which says that a scheduler σ being H-oblivious is a necessary condition for a machine to satisfy tNDI 3 (σ) or tNDS 2 (σ).
. Let a ∈ A satisfy d om(a) = u, then α · a is compatible with σ, and it is now sufficient to show α ′ · a is also compatible with σ. By α · a compatible with σ, there exists a run r ∈ R(M, σ)
s actions are contained in the L-view and there exists only one S ys action, it is obvious that Act(r
. The converse containment follows by symmetry. If (M, σ) ∈ tNDS 2 then by Lemma 5.2(3), which is also Proposition 5.11(3) in part I of the series, (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 3 , and the result immediately follows.
The next lemma shows that for an H-oblivious scheduler, two runs in a machine are necessarily both compatible or both incompatible with the scheduler if they have the same L-view and they are scheduled in the same way.
Lemma 3.4. If r ∈ R(M, σ) and σ is H-oblivious, then for all r
Proof: Given r ′ ∈ R(M ) and σ H-oblivious, we can show that r ′ is compatible with σ by induction on the prefixes of r ′ . We can now show that tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 are preserved by refinement by an H-oblivious scheduler. (Note that the requirement that the refining scheduler be H-oblivious cannot be relaxed, by Lemma 3.3.)
Proof: 
by Lemma 3.4, and r ′ is compatible with π. This gives all that we need to show M ∈ tNDS 2 (σ ′ ).
A statement similar to that of Proposition 3.5 does not hold for tNDI 1 , tNDI 2 and tNDS 1 . For tNDI 1 and tNDI 2 , Figure 1 (a) represents a machine M satisfying (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 2 (hence (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 1 ) for the oblivious scheduler σ with set of schedules (HS ys+S ysH)(H +L) ω . Let σ ′ be the oblivious scheduler producing schedules of the form HS ys(H + L) ω , then σ ⊑ σ ′ and σ ′ is Hoblivious. However, (M, σ ′ ) ∈ tNDI 1 , since the view 0 0 1 is incompatible with any infinite H action sequences starting with h. Also (M, σ ′ ) ∈ tNDI 2 . 
Example 3.6. As an example of the fact that tNDI 3 is preserved by refinement, consider the machine M depicted in Figure 1 (c), and the oblivious scheduler σ that produces schedules in (L+H) ω . We have that (M, σ) ∈ tNDI 3 . Because S ys is never scheduled, L always knows the schedule of the current run by observing when it is scheduled, but it has no way to determine from its view exactly which actions are being performed by H. Let another oblivious scheduler σ ′ produce schedules (LH) ω . Then we have σ ⊑ σ ′ . It can also be shown that (M, σ ′ ) ∈ tNDI 3 . Intuitively, since σ ′ generates a subset of the schedules of σ, and M is secure for every schedule in σ, the machine M is also secure for every schedule in σ ′ . (In this example the schedulers are L-oblivious. Proposition 3.5 also applies to the case where the scheduled domain may depend on what L actions have been performed.)
Note that we refine just the scheduler, but not the system. We remark that the same example shows that tNDI 3 is not preserved by refinement of the system (by reducing nondeterminism in the system). For example, if the system were refined by removing the transition from s 0 to s 2 , then L would be able to deduce from the view 0 ℓ 0 1 that H performed h ′ in the second step.
Given the refinement relation on schedulers, one may regard a scheduler σ as a collection of its deterministic fragments, i.e., the set of deterministic schedulers that refine σ. Define σ d as the set {σ
The following result states, intuitively, that the H-oblivious deterministic fragments of σ cover all the behaviour of σ.
Lemma 3.7.
Proof: For (1) it is trivial. For (2), given a run r = s 0
. . a n is also compatible with σ ′ , so r ∈ R(M, σ ′ ). Note that such a scheduler may not be unique.
Lemma 3.7(1) states that a refinement of a scheduler yields a smaller set of runs than the scheduler it refines. Lemma 3.7(2) states that the collection of H-oblivious deterministic fragments are sufficient to represent the behaviours of an H-oblivious scheduler.
We have shown that some properties, such as tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 , are preserved by all H-oblivious refinements of a scheduler. Now we show the converse: if a machine is secure with respect to all H-oblivious schedulers in σ d , then it is secure with respect to σ. Furthermore, this is the case not just for tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 , but for all our trace-based properties.
Proposition 3.8. For X ∈ {tNDI 1 , tNDI 2 , tNDI 3 , tNDS 1 , tNDS 2 } and σ an Hoblivious scheduler, we have the following.
Proof: For tNDI 1 , suppose a machine M does not satisfy tNDI 1 (σ). Then M does not satisfy tNDI 3 (σ), i.e., there exists a run r ∈ R(M, σ) and α ∈ A * H with |α| = |Act H (r)| such that for all runs r
Since σ ′ is both deterministic and H-oblivious, L is schedule-aware in (M, σ ′ ), so it is equivalent to show M ∈ tNDI 3 (σ ′ ). For this it suffices to show that for all r
(It is obvious that sch(r ′′ ) = sch(r) and |α| = |Act H (r)|.) By Lemma 3.7(1) we have r ′′ ∈ R(M, σ). Then from the fact that for all runs r
, and thus M ∈ tNDI 1 (σ ′ ). The cases of tNDI 2 (σ) and tNDI 3 (σ) are similar.
For tNDS 1 , suppose a machine M does not satisfy tNDS 1 (σ). Then M does not satisfy tNDS 2 (σ). Thus there exists an H strategy π and run r ∈ R(M, σ) such that for all r ′ ∈ R(M, σ, π) with sch(r
. Similarly to the argument above, by Lemma 3.7(2) there exists an H-
Then from the fact that σ is H-oblivious, by induction on the length of r ′′ we have that r ′′ is also a run of R(M, σ, π). Thus from the fact that for all runs r ′ ∈ R(M, σ, π),
, which is contradiction. Therefore M ∈ tNDS 2 (σ ′ ) and thus M ∈ tNDS 1 (σ ′ ). The case of tNDS 2 (σ) can be proved in a similar way.
Note that the contrapositive of this result means that to demonstrate that a system is insecure, it suffices to find a single deterministic schedule with respect to which it is insecure. We will use this fact in Section 5 to prove that some of the distinctions between our definitions of security collapse when we consider security with respect to all schedulers.
Refinement of Scheduler SOLTS
In Section 3, we considered a refinement relation between (abstract) schedulers, and studied the preservation of trace-based security definitions under this notion of refinement. This section, we take up the question of the preservation of the bisimulation-based definitions of the previous section under refinement. In particular, we show that tRES We define a refinement relation on scheduler SOLTS as the reverse of simulation on states of schedulers SOLTS. Given two scheduler SOLTS
Intuitively, q 1 ≤ q 2 means that every possible behavior from the state q 1 is also possible from the state q 2 . Define a bisimulation between A 1 and A 2 to be a relation ≡⊆ Q 1 × Q 2 such that if q 1 ≡ q 2 then 1. sched(q 1 ) = sched(q 2
Proof: Trivial by definition. Simulation can be used to define refinement between states of scheduler SOLTS. If state s simulates state t, then state s has at least as much behaviour as state t. We lift it to a relation between scheduler SOLTS, by defining a relation ⊑ S on all scheduler SOLTS on the signature (A, D, d om).
Definition 4.2. For H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS
or A 2 refines A 1 , if for all initial states q 2 of A 2 , there exists an initial state q 1 of A such that (A 2 , q 2 ) ≤ (A 1 , q 1 ).
Our main concern in this section is the preservation of the unwinding-based security notions under this notion of refinement. Before we come to the main results, we develop a few lemmas. The following result states that for two states in a machine running under a scheduler to be related by a sensitive synchronous unwinding, the corresponding scheduler states must be bisimilar. (Since it also talks about future behaviour, this is a stronger conclusion than that of the similar Lemma 6.2(1) in part I, which says only that the same agent is scheduled at states related by the unwinding.) Lemma 4.3. Let M be a machine and A be an H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS. For all states s 1 , s 2 of M and q 1 , q 2 of A, if there exists a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation
Proof: Define a relation ≈ on the states of A by q 1 ≈ q 2 if there exists a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation ∼, and states s 1 , s 2 of M such that (s 1 , q 1 ) ∼ (s 2 , q 2 ). We show that ≈ is a bisimulation on the state space of A. Let q 1 ≈ q 2 . Then by definition, there exists states s 1 , s 2 of M such that (s 1 , q 1 ) ∼ (s 2 , q 2 ) by a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation ∼.
(1) sched(q 1 ) = sched(q 2 ) is by (s 1 , q 1 ) ∼ (s 2 , q 2 ) and the definition of sensitive unwinding.
(2) We consider the cases a ∈ A L , a ∈ A H and a ∈ A S ys separately.
For all a ∈ A L , and q 1
Using the above lemma, we can now show that the existence of a sensitive unwinding is preserved under refinement of the scheduler implementation. Proof: Suppose A 2 ⊑ S A 1 . Let S be the state space of M , and Q 1 , Q 2 be the state spaces of A 1 and A 2 . Suppose ∼⊆ (S × Q 2 ) 2 is a sensitive unwinding relation on M A 2 , define a relation ≈ on S × Q 1 , by (s 1 , q 1 ) ≈ (s 2 , q 2 ) if (A 1 , q 1 ) ≡ (A 1 , q 2 ) and there exists r 1 , r 2 ∈ Q 2 with (A 1 , q 1 ) ≤ (A 2 , r 1 ), (A 1 , q 2 ) ≤ (A 2 , r 2 ), and (s 1 , r 1 ) ∼ (s 2 , r 2 ). We show that ≈ is a sensitive unwinding relation on M A 1 .
Let (s 1 , q 1 ) ≈ (s 2 , q 2 ), we show the following conditions hold.
• OC is trivial.
• To show SC, if (s 1 , q 1 )
by Lemma 4.1. Thus we have all that we need to show (t 1 , q
Insensitive unwinding is not preserved by scheduler SOLTS refinement
2 ) by Lemma 4.1. Thus we have all that we need to show that (t 1 , q • To show (s 0 , q Note that this result does not hold for insensitive unwinding relations. This can be seen from an example presented in Part I, shown here as Figure 2 . We showed in part I that A 1 and A 2 represent the same scheduler, and there is an insensitive unwinding relation on M A 1 , but there are no insensitive unwinding relations on M A 2 . Since we also have that A 1 ⊑ S A 2 , the same example shows that insensitive unwinding is not preserved by refinement of scheduler SOLTS.
The following example provides an illustration of Proposition 4.4.
Example 4.5. Consider a system in which a transmission buffer is shared between two users, H and L, and the system S ys, under the control of a scheduler. 
S ys q The high level structure of the system is shown in Figure 3 . It works in the following way. A user H or L, when allocated a time slot, may request a message to be sent by writing it to the buffer. A user may also choose to skip. If the buffer contains a message when the system S ys is scheduled, it will dispatch the message immediately. The system does not change the buffer if it is empty.
2
We assume the buffer has a capacity of at most one message. As usual, the security policy says that H is not allowed to interfere with L. A machine M representing the buffer is shown on the left of Figure 4 . State s 0 represents that the buffer is empty, in states s 1 and s 1 it contains an L message and in states s 3 and s 4 it contains an H message. A user can attempt to write to the buffer by performing the action snd L (or snd H ). If L writes to the buffer when it is empty, then L subsequently observes "suc", indicating that the write was successful. If the buffer is not empty when L tries to write, the write will fail and a "f ull" message is returned to L. (Our graphical convention for machines is that only L's observations are shown in the graph, but in this example we may assume, for the sake of simplicity, that H makes the same observation as L at every state, which implies that H can also determine, either from its observation or its knowledge of its action, whether the buffer contains a message. ) Observation ⊥ is used to denote empty observation. Recall that we elide self-loops, so, e.g., there is an implicit edge from s 1 to s 1 labelled snd H .
Consider the scheduler SOLTS A in the middle of Figure 4 , which represents an oblivious scheduler that generates schedules of the form (HS ys+LS ys) ω . We show that M A is secure, by showing that there exists a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation in the combined system M A. For example, one may define a relation ∼ as the set {((s 0 , q 0 ), (s 0 , q 0 )), ((s 0 , q 1 ), (s 0 , q 1 )), ((s 0 , q 2 ), (s 3 , q 2 )), ((s 3 , q 2 ), (s 0 , q 2 )), ((s 3 , q 2 ), (s 3 , q 2 )), ((s 1 , q 3 ), (s 1 , q 3 ))}.
This can be shown to be a sensitive unwinding relation on the scheduled system M A. We leave this as an exercise for the interested reader. Now consider the scheduler SOLTS A ′ , on the right of Figure 4 which represents a scheduler that contains schedules of the form (HS ysLS ys) ω . Now we have A ⊑ S A ′ , i.e., the SOLTS A ′ refines the SOLTS A, in that A ′ is simulated by A. Taking effectively the same relation as above, i.e., defining
, it can also be verified that ∼ ′ is a sensitive synchronous unwinding relation on M A ′ . Essentially, the machine M is insecure, but the only way for H to pass information to L is to write to the buffer and let L detect whether the buffer is full. A carefully designed scheduler, such as the one represented by A, may rule out such possible flows. Moreover, removing choices from A, as implemented in A ′ , does not turn a secure system into an insecure one.
Next, we connect the refinement relation ⊑ on schedulers and the refinement relation ⊑ S on scheduler SOLTS by the following lemmas. Given a scheduler σ, its characteristic scheduler A σ (as per Definition 4.3 in Part I of the paper) is Q, Q 0 , →, {⊥}, obs where
If σ is H-oblivious, in a similar way, A σ H is a deterministic H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS that characterizes σ. We show that both A σ and A σ H are maximal implementations, in the sense that if σ is refined by σ ′ , then A σ is refined by every implementation of σ ′ .
Lemma 4.6. Let σ and σ ′ be two (H-oblivious) schedulers satisfying σ
, →, {⊥}, obs , and let A = Q, Q 0 , →, {⊥}, obs such that A represents σ, i.e., for all sequences α ∈ A * compatible with σ, we have σ A (α) = σ(α). Now we define a relation ≤ ⊆ Q × Q ′ by for all q 1 ∈ Q and q 2 ∈ Q ′ , q 1 ≤ q 2 if there exists α ∈ A * and q 0 ∈ Q 0 such that q 0 α −→ q 1 and q 2 = (α, sched(q 1 )). We show that ≤ is a simulation.
1. If q 1 ≤ q 2 then for some α, we have q 2 = (α, sched(q 1 )), so sched(q 2 ) = sched(q 1 ), as required. Corollary 4.7.
H for all schedulers σ 1 , σ 2 satisfying σ 1 ⊑ σ 2 . (Actually, this simpler technique could also be applied to give proof of Proposition 4.8, but the sequence of results on scheduler SOLTS refinement yields more information, and we have other applications for them below.) Proposition 4.9. Let σ 1 , σ 2 be two H-oblivious schedulers satisfying σ 1 ⊑ σ 2 . Then for all machines M , if M ∈ tRES 
(M, σ) ∈ tRES
H representing σ 1 and A representing σ 2 . Since σ 1 is refined by σ 2 , we have σ 2 (α) ⊆ σ 1 (α), and thus σ A ′ (α) = σ 1 (α).
Since M ∈ tRES However, neither tRES
is preserved by refinement of H-oblivious schedulers. We take the machine M which is depicted in Figure 5 . Let the Hoblivious scheduler σ encode schedules in the form HLL(H + L)L ω . Then we have M ∈ tRES ∃ 2 (σ), i.e., there exists an H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS representing σ, such that an (in)sensitive unwinding relation can be found on the composed SOLTS. To see this, consider the scheduler SOLTS A 1 shown in Figure 7 . A synchronous sensitive unwinding relation ∼ on M A 1 can be constructed as follows.
• For the lower schedule HLLL . . ., we let (s 0 , q 1 ) ∼ (s 0 , q 1 ), (t 1 , q
. Since the fourth transition is scheduled to L, s 5 and s 7 both lead to "0" as L's observations. Similarly, s 6 and s 8 both lead to "1" as L's observations.
• For the upper schedule HLLH . . ., we have (s 0 , q 1 ) ∼ (s 0 , q 1 ), (t 1 , q • σ ′ (ǫ) = {H},
• σ ′ (α) = {L} for all compatible α with |α| = 2,
• σ ′ (α) = {L} for all compatible α with |α| > 3.
We show that for all scheduler SOLTS A that represent σ ′ , there does not exist a synchronous sensitive unwinding relation on M A. Intuitively, the reason is as follows. Note that in the second and third step, L performs two actions, and under the scheduler σ ′ , these actions determine whether L or H is scheduled in the fourth step. Each of the four horizontal streams under this scheduler results in a single final observation. The choice of L or H in the fourth step can change the final observation in the upper two streams, but not in the lower two streams. However, an unwinding would need to relate, already after the second step, each one of the upper two streams to one of the lower two streams in such a way as to lead to the same final observation. Since there is, after the second step, not enough information to know which lower stream will produce the same result as an upper stream, this cannot be done.
More precisely, suppose there were a scheduler SOLTS A = Q, Q 0 , → , {⊥}, obs representing σ ′ and an unwinding relation ∼ on M A. For q 0 ∈ Q 0 , we would have (s 0 , q 0 ) ∼ (s 0 , q 0 ). Then step by step we show that the existence of ∼ leads to contradiction. 2. Since (t 1 , q 1 ) ∼ (t 2 , q ′ 1 ), we choose l 1 ∈ A L for an application of SC. Let q 2 be a state of A such that (t 1 , q 1 ) l1 −→ (s 1 , q 2 ). Then by SC, there exists some s ∈ {s 3 , s 4 } and q ′ 2 ∈ Q, such that (t 2 , q
For the destination state s, we show it is impossible to have (s 1 , q 2 ) ∼ (s, q ′ 2 ) no matter whether we let s be s 3 or s 4 . (a) Suppose s = s 3 . We show it cannot be the case that (s 1 , q 2 ) ∼ (s 3 , q ′ 2 ). Because if so, let us choose l 1 ∈ A L as the action for the next transition. Since M is deterministic from s 1 and s 3 , it follows using SC that we would have (s 5 , q 3 ) ∼ (s 7 , q ′ 3 ) for some q 3 , q
3 ) = H. Now an application of action h 1 from (s 5 , q 3 ) leads to the state (v 0 , q 4 ), and by LR H we must be able to match this by a transition on h 1 from (s 7 , q Recall that for scheduled machines in which L is schedule-aware, the tNDI properties collapse (see Lemma 5.2(1), which is Proposition 5.6(2) in part I of the series) as do the tNDS properties (see Lemma 5.2(2), which is proposition 5.11(3) in part I of the series). We now consider whether there is a similar collapse for the tRES properties. Since the tRES properties concern scheduler implementations, the existence of unwinding relations in a scheduled machine (M, σ) does not seem to be related with L's ability to know the current schedule. We strengthen the requirement by showing the relationship between tRES properties when a scheduler is deterministic. (Recall that L is schedule-aware when the scheduler is deterministic and H-oblivious.) 
and w ∈ σ(γ ′ ). Let the scheduler SOLTS A = Q, Q 0 , →, {⊥}, obs represent σ, i.e., for all states q and γ ∈ A * , we have σ(γ) = {sched(q) | q 0 γ −→ q, q 0 ∈ Q 0 }. Let σ be deterministic, i.e., for all compatible α ∈ A * , we have that σ(α) is a singleton set. We show that A σ H is simulated by A. Define the relation ≤⊆ (µ H (A) * × D) × Q, by (γ, u) ≤ q if there exists q 0 ∈ Q 0 such that q 0 γ −→ q and u = sched(q). We show that ≤ is a simulation. Suppose that (γ, u) ≤ q. We check the two conditions for ≤ to be a simulation. By definition, we have that q 0 γ −→ q and u = sched(q) for some q 0 ∈ Q 0 .
(1) Since sched((γ, u)) = u, we have that sched((γ, u)) = u = sched(q), as required.
(2) Suppose a ∈ A and (γ, u)
and we obtain that q 0
. But, since σ is deterministic, and we also have v ∈ σ(γ ′ ), this implies that sched(q ′ ) = v. Thus we have q 0 Corollary 4.11. If H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS A represents deterministic scheduler σ, then the following are equivalent: Proof: Since σ is deterministic, there exists a sensitive unwinding relation on M A ′ iff there exists an insensitive unwinding relation on M A ′ , by Lemma 6.4 in part I. It therefore suffices to show the equivalence of (2),(4) and (6). 
Proof that tRES
We use the results in this section to finish the only missing case for the the relationships between the properties proposed in Part I.
To show this, we treat σ as a collection of deterministic schedulers refining σ, i.e. the set σ d . Given an action sequence α, write σ α for the set {σ
That is, we take the subset of deterministic H-oblivious fragments of σ that are compatible with α. (Note by the well-formedness assumption, if α is incompatible with
Proof: We assume α is compatible with σ, because otherwise both sides have empty sets. For all u ∈ σ(α), we show u ∈ σ ′ ∈σ α σ ′ (α). Construct an infinite sequence γ ∈ A ω that has its every prefix compatible with σ, and also has α · a as a prefix with d om(a) = u. Then it is obvious that σ γ is a deterministic H-oblivious scheduler that is compatible with σ and σ γ (α) = {u}. Since every prefix of γ is compatible with σ, we can show that σ ⊑ σ γ . Therefore
Lemma 4.13. Given σ, for each σ
is the scheduler SOLTS constructed as the disjoint union of the A σ ′ with σ ′ ∈ σ d , then A(σ) represents σ.
Proof:
We only need to show that for all α ∈ A * , we have σ A(σ) (α) = σ(α).
. By Lemma 4.12, we have
, and the result immediately follows.
Proposition 4.14. For all machines M and schedulers σ,
by Proposition 4.9. Since σ ′ is deterministic and H-oblivious, by Corollary 4.11, we have (M, σ ′ ) ∈ tRES ∃ 2 , i.e., there exists a scheduler SOLTS A σ ′ that represents σ ′ , such that there exists a sensitive unwinding relation on M A σ ′ . Taking the disjoint union of the scheduler SOLTS A σ ′ for all σ ′ ∈ σ d , we get a scheduler SOLTS A(σ) which, by Lemma 4.13, represents σ. Therefore we have a sensitive unwinding relation on M A(σ). This proves (M, σ) ∈ tRES ∃ 2 .
Scheduler-Independent Properties
All the previous properties are about security with respect to a particular scheduler. As already noted above, it is also of interest to consider security with respect to sets of schedulers, since this gives flexibility to configure the system. In this section, we consider security with respect to the set of all H-oblivious schedulers, corresponding to flexibility to choose an arbitrary scheduler while retaining security.
It turns out that some of the distinct trace-based notions of security we have identified collapse when we require security with respect to all H-oblivious schedulers. However, we do not obtain a similar collapse for the bisimulationbased notions. We also show that for the trace-based properties, it is possible to give a very simple characterization of security with respect to all H-oblivious schedulers in terms of security with respect to one particular scheduler. We also find such characterizations for two of the bisimulation-based notions (tRES ∀ 1 and tRES ∀ 2 ). Moreover, in one case (tRES ∀ 2 ) we are able to reduce security with respect to all schedulers to security with respect to a particular scheduler SOLTS.
Intuitively, given a system controlled by a nondeterministic scheduler, if there is evidence that the system is insecure, then that evidence can also be produced by a finite deterministic fragment of that scheduler. As a consequence of Proposition 3.8, we obtain the following results. we have tNDI 1 (σ) = tNDI 2 (σ) = tNDI 3 (σ), by Lemma 5.2(1) and tNDS 1 (σ) = tNDS 2 (σ), by Lemma 5.2(2). By Lemma 5.2(3), we have tNDS 1 (σ) ⊆ tNDI 1 (σ). The result immediately follows. To show that tNDS i (Υ HO ) for i ∈ {1, 2} is strictly stronger than tNDI j (Υ HO ) for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} we refer to Figure 1(c) which is a machine in tNDI 3 (σ) for all deterministic H-oblivious σ, but it is obviously not in tNDS 1 (Υ HO ). We now show, using the results on refinement relations over schedulers, that we are able to characterize security over the set of schedulers Υ HO by security with respect to a single scheduler. Define a chaos scheduler σ c by σ
Proof: By Corollary 5.3, it suffices to consider only X = tNDI 3 and X = tNDS 2 . Since σ c ∈ Υ HO , we only need to show X(σ c ) ⊆ X(Υ HO ). Let X be tNDI 3 and let M be a machine with M ∈ tNDI 3 (σ c ). By Proposition 5.1, it suffices to show to show that for all σ ∈ Υ HO ∩ Υ d we have M ∈ tNDI 3 (σ). This can be derived by Proposition 3.5 using σ c ⊑ σ and σ is H-oblivious. For X = tNDS 2 it can be proved in a similar way.
This result helps us to reduce verification of a trace-based property with respect to Υ HO to the same security property with respect to the particular scheduler σ c . (Recall that the trace-based properties are scheduler-implementation independent, so we may further work with the smallest implementation of σ c for verification purposes.)
Considering the relation to the bisimulation-based properties, it is immediate from Proposition 6.6 in part I [vdMZ12] and Proposition 4.14 that we have the chain of containments tRES
can be seen to be strict using the above characterization of tNDS 1 (Υ HO ) as tNDS 1 (σ c ). Consider the machine M of Figure 6 . We argued in part I of our series (in the proof of Proposition 6.8) that this is in tNDS 1 (σ rr ) for the scheduler σ rr that alternates H and L; similar reasoning shows that it is in tNDS 1 (σ c ): even for this more flexible scheduler, all that H can control with its strategy is whether the upper or the lower branch is taken, but both yield the same possible L views. Hence M ∈ tNDS 1 (Υ HO ). We already have shown in part I that M ∈ tRES
Now it is straightforward that we have that tRES
, and tNDS 1 (Υ HO ) = tNDS 2 (Υ HO ) by Corollary 5.3. For the relationships between the rest of the properties, by Proposition 4.14, we have tRES
, and the following result (Proposition 5.5) shows that this inclusion is strict. Furthermore, it is immediate that the containments tRES
, and by tRES
, respectively. We refer to Figure 11 as an overview of the aforementioned relationships, where the solid arrows denote strict inclusion and dashed arrows denote inclusion with their strictness left open in this paper.
Proof: To show this, we assume the signature ({h,
Consider the machine M and the scheduler SOLTS A 1 and A 2 depicted in Figure 7 . We used this example in part I to show that sensitive unwinding relation is implementation dependent: we showed there that there exists a sensitive unwinding relation on M A 1 , but there do not exist sensitive unwinding relations on M A 2 . Thus, we have M ∈ tRES ∀ 2 (Υ HO ) since there does not exist a synchronous sensitive unwinding relation on M A 2 . Moreover, as S ys is never scheduled in the scheduler represented by A 2 , there does not exist a synchronous insensitive unwinding relation on M A 2 , either. Therefore M ∈ tRES
The argument for this is as follows. Since L and S ys have a single action each, every H-oblivious scheduler σ can be implemented by an H-oblivious scheduler SOLTS A, in which all transitions are deterministic, and the only source of nondeterminism is that there exist multiple initial states. More precisely, consider a scheduler SOLTS A 1 consisting of an infinite set of states q 0 , q 1 , . . . , with q i a −→ q i+1 for all actions a enabled on q i . Every scheduler σ can be implemented by a scheduler SOLTS A that is a disjoint union of such linear scheduler SOLTS. We show that there exists a sensitive unwinding on M A 1 for such linear A 1 , and by taking unions of these sensitive unwindings, it follows that there exists a sensitive unwinding on A, hence M ∈ tRES ∃ 2 (Υ HO ). We briefly describe how to establish a sensitive unwinding relation ∼ on M A 1 . Note that we do not leave state s 0 until H is scheduled. Let q i be the first state in A with sched(q i ) = H, and let (s 0 , q j ) ∼ (s 0 , q j ) for all 0 ≤ j ≤ i. In the next step we move to s or t, and remain there until L is scheduled. Let q k be the first state in A such that k > i and sched(q k ) = L, and then we let (s, q j ) ∼ (t, q j ) for all i + 1 ≤ j ≤ k. To construct the unwinding on the states reached by this next L action, we need to look ahead to the next time H is scheduled. Let α be the longest sequence of states in the form q k q k+1 . . . q m satisfying sch(α) ∈ L(D \ {L}) * LS ys * . We have the following two cases.
•
• If sched(q m+1 ) = H, we let (s 1 , q k+1 ) ∼ (s 4 , q k+1 ) and (s 2 , q k+1 ) ∼ (s 3 , q k+1 ).
The rest of the definition for ∼ is straightforward. This shows that M ∈ tRES and simplified from a case study in [Zha09, Chapter 6.2], which is motivated from a block device that uses a file server to support networks with multiple security levels [Gra08] .
Example 5.9. Here we assume there are only two agents H and L. The structure of the system is depicted in Fig. 9 . The device contains a single processor with a hard disk for data-storage. We omit the processor in the figure because it does not have an effect on our analysis. We further assume there is only a single file f H belonging to agent H and a single file f L belonging to agent L, both of a fixed size. The communication between the system and agents is done via input buffers and output buffers. Either H or L can read and write its corresponding input buffer and can read but not write the contents of its output buffer. The system operates at multiple security levels and can both read and write these buffers. Apart from the above components, a scheduling algorithm is implemented that allocates time slices for reading and executing instructions. When an agent is scheduled, it may request to read or write a file by writing to its input buffer, and read from its output buffer written by the system. The system handles a request only when it is scheduled. In the model we assume a signature (A, {H, L, Sys}, d om), where the set of actions A = u∈D\{S ys} I u ∪ A Sys , with I u the instruction set of user u, and A Sys = {τ }. The passage of time is observable to the users, as they share a global clock with the system, and the finest time unit distinguishable by a user is a single slice (tick). An action of each agent, including τ , takes one tick.
We assume each file can be regarded as a string of binary numbers with length n. Given a user u, the set of instructions I u includes r u (f, i): read file f ∈ {f H , f L } at index i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, w u (f, x, i): write a bit x to file f at index i, and ǫ u : a special input that denotes skipping (this could be viewed as an abstraction of any action that is local to an agent and not pertinent to the filestore). When the system is writing to a user's output buffer, it uses 'ok' to indicate access granted, 'deny' for access declined, '⊥' for the default empty observation, or a binary number as the bit value being returned. A buffer may contain at most one message. We formally define the device M = S, S 0 , → , O, obs as follows.
-If s 1 (LI) = ⊥, then the system prioritizes the L request, and s
for some L output o, by (r-grt-LL), (r-deny-LH), (w-grt-LL) and (w-grt-LH). Since (s 1 , q) ∼ (s 2 , q), we have s 2 (LI) = s 1 (LI) or s 2 (f L ) = s 1 (f L ). In particular, the request to be processed is the same in (s 1 , q) and (s 2 , q), and the same transition rule will apply. Suppose s 1 (LI) is a read request, then either we have the access both granted and the same content returned from s 1 (f L ) and s 2 (f L ) (by (r-grt-LL)), or the access is declined from both s 1 and s 2 (by (r-deny-LH)). Suppose s 1 (LI) is a write request, then it is always granted with ok returned to LO (by (w-grt-LL) and (w-grt-LH)), and either the same part of s 1 (f L ) and s 2 (f L ) is modified, or the same part of s 1 (f H ) and s 2 (f H ). Therefore, in all above cases, there exists (s 2 , q)
• The case of LR H can be proved by easily checking that H actions never change the components f L , LI and LO (rules (act-H) and (skip)).
Related Work
Refinement has previously been considered in the literature on information flow security. The main difference with our work is that we consider the impact of schedulers on security. We consider systems consisting of a machine and scheduler, and focus on refinement of the scheduler in particular, rather than on refinement of the system as an undifferentiated whole.
We have considered two definitions of refinement, at the level of abstract schedulers σ and at the level of their concrete implementations by scheduler SOLTS. Both definitions are more or less standard, in that they treat refinement as reduction of nondeterminism. Our notion of refinement of abstract schedulers states that a refinement of σ reduces the set of possibilities for the next agent scheduled after a given sequence α of actions. This is related to trace refinement, as defined, e.g., in CSP [Ros97] , since if σ ⊑ σ ′ then any trace of (M, σ ′ ) will be a trace of (M, σ). Note, however, that it is not equivalent to trace refinement of the combined system (M, σ), in that scheduler refinement cannot constrain which actions the scheduled agent is able to perform, whereas trace refinement does have this power. Our notion of refinement on scheduler SOLTS is a variant of simulation [Par81] which is well known to be a sound proof technique for trace refinement.
Our notion of scheduler in SOLTS differs from that used in process algebra, in which schedulers are used to resolve nondeterministic behaviours, e.g., by selecting a predefined label on actions. In this way, a process, if combined with scheduler, becomes a new process that refines the original process. Bisimulation relations are not preserved by this type of refinement. An interesting work by Konstantinos et al. [CNP09] introduces a stronger type of bisimulation relation which requires bisimilarity to hold for all schedulers. This relation can be used to prove secrecy of security protocol even if an attacker controls the scheduler. That is, after a scheduler is introduced to refine the original system, the new refined system is secure provided the original system is secure by equivalencebased definitions of security.
Besides refinement of nondeterminism, there are notions of action refinement in the literature [vGG01] , in which a refinement of a system can replace an abstract action by behaviours expressed in terms of new concrete actions. A recent work by Bossi et al. [BPR07] formalizes action refinement in the security process algebra SPA. They treat both trace-based and bisimulation based information flow properties [FG95] defined in SPA and conclude that the unwinding characterized persistent properties [FR06] are closed under action refinement. We have not studied this sense of refinement in this paper. Data refinement [dRE98] , which operates at the level of state representation e.g. the implementation of an abstract set data type into a list based implementation, is also out of the scope of the present work, although simulation is also a valuable proof technique in this area.
It has frequently been noted in the literature that information flow security is not necessarily preserved by refinement of a system: this is known as the refinement paradox [Jac88, McL94] . Whether this is a problem depends on the role that nondeterminism plays in the system model, which can impact whether one expects that reduction of the nondeterminism during system design will be necessary. In case that nondeterminism arises from underspecification, one expects to move to more determinate specifications, so the refinement paradox is a genuine concern. However, if the nondeterministic behaviour is inherent in the system and is not under the control of any agent (e.g., represents deliberate randomization that is used to hide information), then reduction of nondeterminism is undesirable, and the refinement paradox is less problematic.
We note that our definitions address refinement concerns in a number of ways: first, we have allowed nondeterminism in the scheduler, but have stated definitions such as tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 that require system security for all schedules, which can be viewed as deterministic refinements of a given nondeterministic scheduler -such definitions are preserved under refinement of the nondeterminism in the scheduler. Similarly, the strategic definitions we have stated (tNDS 1 and tNDS 2 ) implicitly quantify over all deterministic H behaviours, so are also preserved under refinement of H behaviour. However, all our definitions retain the inherent nondeterminism in the system itself, so may not be preserved under refinement of this source of nondeterminism: this is a question that we have not considered in this paper.
As preservation of security under refinement has generally been considered to be desirable, a number of works have had the objective of developing refinement operators that preserve information flow properties. The details depend on the underlying systems and security property definitions. If the security definition is trace-based and refinement is the subset relation on traces, one approach is to construct a deterministic subsystem. Jacob [Jac88, Jac89] presents a way to derive secure implementations from an insecure system S, by parallel composition with the most general deterministic process P satisfying the security property, i.e., S P will be secure. Roscoe's determinism-based security notions [Ros95] are preserved with respect to CSP refinement, which yields a verification methodology using the FDR model checker [GGH + 99]. GrahamCumming and Sanders [GCS91] specify security as trace equivalence with respect to a given user, and refinement as a downwards simulation, using the Z-specification language.
Heisel et al. [HPS01, SHP02] define a confidentially preserving notion of refinement for a probabilistic version of CSP and also discuss the compositionality of that refinement operation. Mantel [Man01] presents two step-wise refinement operators on trace-based properties of event systems (ES). These two operations work by adding or deleting transitions to preserve the unwinding relations on state event systems (SES). A number of examples are given to show that this technique could be applied for all trace properties expressible by the basic security properties (BSP) [Man00] . Bossi et al. [BFPR03b] study refinement for persistent security properties [BFPR03a] in a CCS based system, where they define refinement as the reverse of the simulation relation (similar to our treatment on scheduler SOLTS). Similar to Mantel's approach, the refinement operators introduced in that paper involve deleting more transitions than the traditional refinement operator, in order to maintain observational equivalence to the low security level agent L. Alur et al. [AČZ06] present a very general framework for representing deducibility-based information flow properties. Their secrecy preserving refinement operator requires a strong condition that the implementation simulates its specification. These works all deal with automaton-like representations of systems. Program-like representations have also been considered: [Mor06] defines a refinement relation for a simple sequential calculus that preserves ignorance (as expressed in a logic of knowledge [FHMV95] ).
We have not studied compositionality or contextuality of our security properties, but it would be interesting to pursue this. Compositional security or related notions of security on automaton and trace theoretic models have been discussed in the prior literature [McC87, McC90] .
The complexity of verifying several information flow security properties closely related to those of the present paper in finite state synchronous systems has been studied in [CvdMZ10] . A slightly different notion of scheduled system is adopted in that work, but but based on the results we would conjecture that the unwinding-based properties of the present paper are tractable (in PTIME), but the tNDI and tNDS variants are intractable, being complete in PSPACE and EXPSPACE, respectively. (It remains to be shown that these complexities hold for the exact model and the multiple variants of the security notions of the present paper.) This resembles the results in the literature, as for asynchronous sytems, verification of trace-based information flow properties (such as NDI [vdMZ07] and NDC [FG95] ) are PSPACE-complete, but the verification of unwinding based properties or persistent bisimulation based properties usually can be performed in PTIME [FPR02, vdMZ07] . 
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered information flow security properties on a synchronous state machine model with a discrete-time semantics and a definition of scheduler. The security properties extend nondeducibility [Sut86] , nondeducibility on strategies [WJ90] and restrictiveness [McC88] in a synchronous setting with scheduling. We have studied the preservation of these security properties under refinement of schedulers. The relationship between the properties are shown in Figure 10 , where we mark by ⋆ the notions that are preserved by refinement of schedulers.
To summarize, we find that for trace-based properties, only the stronger ones, i.e., tNDI 3 and tNDS 2 are preserved by H-oblivious scheduler refinement, while the other trace-based properties are not preserved by scheduler refinement. For bisimulation-based properties, we have shown that tRES Finally, we have reduced the verification of a number of security properties that quantify over all H-oblivious schedulers (including all trace-based properties with respect to Υ HO , tRES ∀ 1 (Υ HO ) and tRES ∀ 2 (Υ HO )) to security properties that refer just to a single scheduler. In particular for tRES ∀ 2 (Υ HO ), we reduce its verification to finding sensitive unwinding relations when combining with a particular scheduler SOLTS. This allows us to characterize the relationships between security properties with respect to the set of schedulers Υ HO . The results are depicted in Figure 11 , where the solid arrows denote strict inclusion and The positive results of this paper have the following application. Where we have shown that a notion of security is preserved under scheduler refinement, we obtain a desirable level of flexibility in the choice of scheduler when configuring a system: any refinement of a scheduler for which a machine is known to be secure can be used in place of that scheduler, while maintaining security. Moreover, Theorem 5.4 and Theorem 5.8 show that to prove security with respect to the class of all H-oblivious schedulers, for all trace-based security definitions and for the bisimulation-based security definition tRES ∀ 2 , it suffices to verifying security with respect to the special scheduler σ c (which has a finite state representation).
However, we have left open the question of how, practically, to show that a particular scheduled machine satisfies a security property. Automated verification of these properties would be desirable, if possible.
